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1 INTRODUCTION
The article by Cees de Groot about the Shell Nigeria case in this
issue of ECL illustrates that piercing of the corporate veil of a
foreign subsidiary aimed at its parent company’s liability is a
topical issue. In said proceedings the Dutch judge, i.e, the Court of
Appeal of The Hague, deals with the merits of the case on the
basis of applicable Nigerian (common) law. In a similar case,
however, it was precisely the other way around. The question
whether the German parent company HELM A.G. (hereafter
‘HELM’) could be held liable for the damage caused by its Dutch
subsidiary Vos B.V. (hereafter ‘Vos’) was ruled on the basis of
Dutch ‘piercing law’, in accordance with what parties had
consented to be the applicable law.
Claimants in this case were Marie Payen, mother of the
deceased Pamela Sue Payen, and other parents and representatives
of Haitian children who died or were severely injured for life by
the use of an over-the-counter cough syrup by the end of the last
century (hereafter ‘Claimants’). The syrup contained glycerine
contaminated with diethylene glycol, which chemical is commonly
used in automobile anti-freeze. When consumed by human beings
it causes serious kidney, liver and heart defects. Pamela Sue Payen
was five years old when she died.
2 JURISDICTION
Initially Claimants sued both Vos and HELM in the US (Florida).
However, in its award of 15 July 2009 the Florida District Court of
Appeal (Third District) ruled that it had no jurisdiction to decide
over the claim against Vos because of the latter’s lack of
continuous and systematic business contacts with Florida, the
requisite threshold. However, HELM’s many business contacts with
Florida over the years were undeniable and because of that HELM
had already conceded to Florida jurisdiction. So in conclusion the
Court of Appeal’s award resulted in US jurisdiction over the parent
(HELM), but not over the subsidiary that had actually caused the
damage in Haiti (Vos).
3 PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
To get a clear picture of the impact of the case let me quote from
the rather emotional introduction into the facts, as presented by
the Court of Appeal in its ruling on (the lack of) jurisdiction
regarding Vos:
The facts and circumstances underlying this case can only be
described as heart-breaking. From 1995 through 1997, a tainted
batch of children’s fever medicine was distributed in Haiti causing
the deaths of more than seventy children, and the serious illness of
a number of other children. Public health officials traced the
deaths and illnesses to a shipment of glycerine that was
manufactured in China, purchased through a German company,
and eventually sent to Haiti by Vos. The plaintiffs are either the
personal representatives of the estates of the deceased children, or
the parents of the survivors.
The complaint alleges that in 1994, Vos purchased seventy-two
drums of glycerine from China, tested samples, found them to be
impure and tainted with diethylene glycol, but nevertheless
proceeded to sell the glycerine to one of its customers in Haiti after
affixing false labels to the drums. The tainted glycerine was
incorporated into a children’s fever medicine, and the injuries and
deaths followed.
* The author acted as expert on Dutch corporate law on the side of Claimants. E-mail: s.m.bartman@law.leidenuniv.nl.
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After the Court of Appeal’s award Vos was clearly off the hook.
Criminal action against Vos and its management in the
Netherlands had led to a sloppy financial settlement with the
public prosecutor. Although critical questions were raised in Dutch
Parliament and the disaster even inspired an author to write a
novel about it,1 no further action was taken.
However, the case against Vos’ German parent company HELM
picked up where it was left in first instance before the Circuit
Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade
County, Florida, and where it was initiated as early as 1997. As a
next step parties agreed on a way to proceed before this Court. The
arrangement, which was supported by the Court, entailed not only
that Dutch law would ultimately apply to the piercing issue but
also that the possibility of piercing Vos’ corporate veil to HELM’s
detriment under Dutch law would be dealt with first, while
HELM’s actual liability and the size of Claimants’ damage would
be decided at a subsequent stage. It was a generally recognized fact
that right from its incorporation Vos would simply never be able
to cover damage in an amount as caused in Haiti. Hence the
decision to aim the arrows of liability at HELM alone after the
court’s establishment of Florida jurisdiction over that company.
The Court refers to this procedural arrangement in the second last
paragraph of its verdict where it states: ‘( . . .) the Court bifurcated
the piercing issue from the liability and damage trials.’
Obviously the agreement to let the Court decide first whether
under Dutch law granting the claim against HELM would be a
(theoretical) option logically implies the assumption that parties
(and the Court itself) were also in agreement that something went
horribly wrong at subsidiary level. If not, there would be no
(realistic) ground for piercing Vos’ corporate veil in the first place
and hence this whole procedural exercise would serve no goal from
the start. Still, and painful as it is, this is exactly the conclusion of
the Court in its verdict of 2 July, 2015, after numerous and
extensive hearings of witnesses and experts had taken place. The
Court establishes a ‘logical flaw’ in the set up of proceedings ‘which
compels this court to decline to pierce the corporate veil under Dutch
law.’
It should be noted that a piercing claim under Dutch law
against a parent company is based on general tort law, i.e., Article
6:162 of the Dutch Civil Code (hereafter ‘DCC’). Such a claim is
not derived from, let alone dependant on the subsidiary being
found liable in earlier legal proceedings, but follows from the
parent’s own illegal action by violating its duty of care or otherwise
acting in tort toward Claimants. Hence, the established lack of
jurisdiction over Vos alone does not and could not preclude the
Court from imposing liability on HELM, on the basis of Article
6:162 DCC. Nevertheless the Court reasons as follows:
It has already been determined that that there is no jurisdiction
over Vos. Therefore, Vos’s liability will never be fixed here.
Without an adjucation of liability, Plaintiff will not acquire the
creditor status currently necessary under Dutch law for piercing to
occur. ( . . .) The court is compelled to conclude that a Dutch court
would not pierce the corporate veil for a non-creditor personal
injury claimant under these circumstances.
This of course is a bitter conclusion from the Claimants’
standpoint. Moreover, the conclusion is based on a wrong
interpretation and perception of applicable Dutch law. The Court
should have realized at a far earlier stage that not formally-
established liability (the status of creditor), but the recognition by
the Court of an actual disaster caused by the subsidiary for which
it is or might have been held liable, is indeed a conditio sine qua
non for successfully bringing a piercing the corporate veil-action
against a parent company. If it were different, the mere fact of a
subsidiary’s bankruptcy would in practice always prevent a
successful claim against the parent. Why sue a bankrupt subsidiary
company which offers no prospect for any compensation at all, or
which might not even exist any longer upon or shortly after its
liquidation?2 By the way, this is not only the situation according to
Dutch corporate law, but as far as I know it is in line with the
situation in any (western) jurisdiction, including the US.3
4 LEX DURA SED LEX?
This being said, the wordings of the final paragraph of its verdict
clearly demonstrate that the Court had great trouble in accepting
its own conclusion, especially in light of the fact that over the years
HELM consistently refused to offer adequate compensation to the
injured Haitian children and the parents of the deceased ones. For
a company that spends so much effort and money on the
Kindergarten facilities of its own employees, this surely must have
been a tough decision.4 The Court, trapped in its own erroneous
reasoning set forth above, sadly concludes:
Given the facts as described by the Third District Court of Appeal,
this is a troubling result from a moral standpoint. If the
allegations are true, Vos decided that the profit from 72 drums of
contained glycerine was more important than the lives it would
destroy. These lives mattered. These children mattered. However,
this is the result required under the law. Plaintiffs chose to sue in
1 Marjolijn Februari, De literaire kring, Prometheus Amsterdam, 2008.
2 See e.g. Samantha Reussen’s contribution in this issue of ECL about the Dutch practice of the so-called turbo-liquidation of a company. In fact Vos BV legally merged with and
disappeared into HELM Holland BV in 2006.
3 cf. Karen Vandekerckhove, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Volume 2 in the Book Series from the Centre for European Company Law (CECL), Kluwer Law International, 2007.
4 http://www.helmag.com/career/what-we-offer/helm-benefits/kindergarten/.
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Florida where Vos had insufficient contacts. This ruling does not
address the question of liability for the despicable alleged acts
elsewhere.
5 APPEAL
The reader will find the full text of the Court’s verdict printed
hereafter. By appellate brief of 23 March 2016, Payen c.s. filed an
appeal against it with the Florida Court of Appeal (Third District).
ECL’s editorial board has decided to closely monitor the
continuation of this interesting case, which illustrates the ever-
growing interconnection of the world’s various legal systems.
Hence to be continued.
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